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THE NEW CRISIS FOR THE NEW CENTURY: SOME
OBSERVATIONS ON THE "BIG-PICTURE"
LESSONS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF
2008
SAULE T. OMAROVA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented scale and complex contagion effects of
the current financial crisis, which rapidly spread across geographic
borders and market segmentation lines, forcefully underscored the
urgent need for policy-makers, financial regulators, and market
participants around the world to develop a deeper substantive
understanding of the fundamental changes in the dynamics of
modern financial markets. Although, in a historical perspective,
all financial crises tend to display certain basic commonalities, two
key factors make the crisis of 2008 qualitatively different from the
panics and crashes of the past centuries. First, this is the world's
first truly global financial crisis. Second, this is a crisis rooted
fundamentally in the successes of financial innovation and an
unprecedented complexity of financial products, which resulted
from such innovation. Each of these unique characteristics of the
current crisis has major implications from the perspective of
regulatory reform in the financial services sector, both on the
domestic and the international level. This essay sketches in broad
strokes some of these high-level implications.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of
Law.
1. For an insightful and entertaining discussion and comparison of different
financial crises, see, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS,
PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); see also Luc
Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database (IMF Working
Paper No. WP081224, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2008/wp08224.pdf.
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II. THE GLOBAL SCOPE OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
The first financial crisis of the Twenty-First Century is the
first genuinely global one. All of the prior financial crises were
generally confined either to the emerging markets2 or to certainS3
mature economies, with only a limited spillover effect. By
contrast, the current crisis, which originated in the U.S. subprime
mortgage market, has directly affected every economy, regardless
of its geographic location, size, or developmental status. The
industrialized countries, including the United States, the European
Union, and Japan, have suffered the bulk of the direct losses from
the rapid decline in the value of mortgage-backed and other asset-
backed securities, excessive leveraging of financial investments,
and failure or near-failure of the world's largest financial
institutions. China, Russia, Brazil, and other emerging market
economies suffered the secondary effects of the stock market
decline and credit shock in the industrialized world, as the demand
for their exports contracted severely and foreign investors
withdrew massive amounts of capital.4
At its heart, the current crisis exposed the fundamental
tension between the increasingly globalized and interconnected
nature of today's financial markets, on the one hand, and an
inherently fragmented nationally-based approach to financial
sector regulation and supervision, on the other. Although the
crisis was clearly systemic in nature and stretched across
geographic borders, the efforts to contain it were largely
conducted by individual governments struggling to put together
effective responses to their countries' particular problems.
International and multilateral institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, played a
rather limited role in containing the crisis.' In this context, the
2. Such as the 1997 East Asian crisis or the 2001 financial crisis in Argentina.
3. Such as the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s or the Japanese
banking crisis of the 1990s.
4. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Financial Crisis: The
Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34742_20081110.pdf.
5. This is not to say that multilateral institutions have not played any role in
managing the global financial crisis. The IMF provided financing packages for several
countries, including Iceland, Hungary, Ukraine, and Pakistan, and established a
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critical importance of effective cooperation, information-sharing,
and policy coordination among various national financial
regulators and central banks became especially clear. At the same
time, the crisis has shown how conflicting domestic policy concerns
in times of stress pose significant potential threats to inter-
governmental cooperation.' In the aftermath of the crisis, any
efforts to establish a functioning international regulatory order will
have to take a serious account of this fundamental tension
between the rhetoric of cooperation and the reality of potential
conflict among sovereign governments facing complex policy
choices.
Coping with potential failure of systemically important,
internationally active financial conglomerates has also highlighted
a broader trend toward decreasing the level of autonomy national
financial regulators are able to exercise in their domestic policy-
making. Because of the cross-border operations of the world's
largest financial institutions, certain purely domestic actions by
one country's government often force the hand of another
country's government Moreover, the sheer size of the asset base
of large, internationally active financial conglomerates
fundamentally undermines the ability of many countries' central
banks to act as a domestic lender of last resort and save these
institutions from failure. In the post-crisis environment, it is
impossible to hold on to the illusion of complete sovereignty in
financial sector regulation and supervision.
specialized short-term lending facility for providing liquidity support to individual
countries. For further information, see International Monetary Fund, Financial Crisis,
http:l/www.imf.org/external/np/exr/key/finstab.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
6. Perhaps, the most vivid illustration of this complex dynamics was the
infamous conflict between the United Kingdom and Iceland over the U.K.
depositors' funds at troubled Icelandic banks. In October 2008, the U.K. used anti-
terrorist laws to seize the estimated £4bn ($6.8 billion) in assets of a failed Icelandic
bank, Landsbanki, and put the U.K. subsidiaries of another Icelandic bank,
Kaupthing, in bankruptcy proceedings, which led to Kaupthing's nationalization.
Iceland's government threatened to sue the U.K. for these actions. See Sarah
O'Connor, Iceland to sue over "bullying" reaction, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008.
7. One example of such externally induced policy response was the decision of
the Belgian government to sell the Belgian operations of Fortis Bank S.A./N.V. to a
French bank BNP Paribas after the Dutch government backed out of the existing
rescue plan and unexpectedly nationalized Fortis' Dutch operations in October 2008.
See, e.g., Press Release, Fortis, Fortis Confirms Sale of Banking and Belgian
Insurance activities (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.fortis.com/press/info/UK-
PRFortis_06102008.pdf.
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This raises a fundamental issue of whether or not the time
has come to establish a truly supra-national regulatory regime in
the financial services sector. Structurally, potential choices in this
area range from the proposals to set up a single "global financial
regulator" to the more modest plans to establish cross-border
colleges of supervisors for a coordinated oversight of the
operations of large, internationally active financial conglomerates.
The leaders of the G-20 countries, meeting in Washington, D.C. in
November 2008, expressed their explicit support for the latter
solution in the near term.8 It remains to be seen how effective this
new scheme will be in practice and whether or not it will serve as
the first step toward a more comprehensive system of global
financial regulation and coordination.
III. COMPLEXITY, RISK, AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
Although the initial trigger for the financial crisis was the
bursting of the bubble in the U.S. subprime mortgage market in
the summer of 2007, the true causes of the current financial
turmoil are more intricate and intimately connected to the very
process of financial innovation in the decades preceding it. The
unprecedented speed with which the crisis has spread through the
global financial system was a direct result of the complexity of
innovative financial products, including various derivative
instruments, and the high degree of interconnectedness these
instruments created among the individual market actors and the
entire market segments.
For instance, it was the emergence and expansion of the
wholesale markets for sophisticated mortgage-backed instruments,
including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), that created an
increasing demand for mortgages and other credit products.
Without the ready availability of distribution channels, the
origination of loans, including subprime mortgages, would not
have reached such disastrous proportions or quality.9 As this crisis
8. See The Group of Twenty, Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets
and the World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008), available at www.un.org/ga/president/63/
commission/declarationG20.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Jennfier E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Law and Economic
Issues in Subprime Litigation (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series No.612,
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demonstrated, the interconnection between retail financial
markets and wholesale financial markets is a complex
phenomenon, which raises serious questions about the continuing
wisdom of a deregulatory approach to wholesale financial markets.
Not only did the crisis show that even the wealthiest and the most
financially savvy investors are vulnerable to irrational exuberance
and, at times, outright fraud,"° it has also highlighted the extent of
indirect exposure of the general investing public, the retail
consumers of financial services, to the risks inherent in complex
financial transactions in institutional markets. At the very least,
this interconnection and interdependence between the wholesale
and retail financial markets calls into question traditional
justifications for letting the "big boys" play entirely by their own
rules."
Another key lesson of this crisis is that, contrary to the
prevailing wisdom of the 1980s and 1990s, there is such a thing as
too much financial risk, not only at the level of an individual
enterprise, such as Lehman Brothers or American International
Group (AIG), but also at the systemic level. One indicator of such
excessive amount of risk is the inability of either the private
market actors or the regulators to monitor or measure, effectively
and accurately, the total exposure to risk at the level of a single
institution or the entire financial system. Arguably, it is possible
that, at a certain level of complexity, interconnectedness, and
leveraging in global financial markets, risk simply cannot be
"managed" in a reliable way. Despite its deceptive simplicity,
introducing this basic assumption into our regulatory philosophy
would have profound implications for the substance and
architecture of financial sector regulation.
2008).
10. The unveiling of Bernard Madoff's "ponzi scheme" in December 2008 is an
example of a successful fraud perpetrated on highly sophisticated and wealthy
investors. See, e.g., Complaint, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Bernard Madoff, No. 08-CIV-10791 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp-madoffl2llO8.pdf.
11. This was the fundamental premise of The Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. Law No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), which essentially exempted from
regulatory and supervisory oversight over-the-counter derivatives transactions among
sophisticated counterparties.
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More generally, the current financial crisis has brought to
light that, as a result of rapid financial innovation in recent years,
risk has become a financial asset in its own right. As a financial
asset, risk is continuously dissected, priced, and traded in a variety
of increasingly esoteric transactions among sophisticated entities.
The financial crisis also drew attention to a hidden paradox: while
this virtually limitless "slicing and dicing" of financial risk may
decrease risk exposure for individual market players, it tends to
increase the overall riskiness and vulnerability of the financial
system.
This fundamental transformation in the nature of financial
intermediation has been going on for the last two or three decades.
It took a major crisis, however, to expose the magnitude of the
change and the depth of the schism between the financial
industry's new business and risk profile, on the one hand, and the
existing system of financial sector regulation, on the other. As we
deliberate on how to restructure the regulatory framework for the
financial services sector, it is critically important to focus the
debate on the fundamental issues underlying the current crisis. A
new regulatory scheme, whatever its ultimate shape may be, must
reflect the transformation in the nature and patterns of
distribution of risk in global financial markets and explicitly
address the need to control risk in this new, and changing,
environment.
From this perspective, the focus on regulating specific
financial products or activities, such as credit default swaps or
mortgage-backed securities, which were directly implicated in
triggering or magnifying the effects of the current crisis, is
fundamentally misplaced. 2 The next systemic shock is most likely
12. In the wake of the revelations of the ominous role credit default swaps played
in the Lehman Brothers saga and the near-demise of AIG, there were several
proposals to introduce regulation of these instruments. The Superintendent of the
New York State Insurance Department, Eric R. Dinallo, announced in September
2008 that his Department would start regulating credit default swaps as insurance
products, but later suspended his plan, as several private companies began actively
setting up clearinghouses for credit default swaps. See Dinallo Will Not Regulate
Default Swaps As Firms Prepare Clearinghouse Operations, BNA Banking Daily at
D7 (Dec. 15, 2008). The Securities and Exchange Commission has also made an
attempt to claim regulatory jurisdiction over so-called "naked" credit default swaps
that did not fall under the category of insurance products for lack of the "insurable
interest." See, e.g., Emily Flitter, SEC Seeks Authority Over Credit Derivatives, Am.
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to originate in a different pocket of the financial market. As the
markets for some financial products are evaporating as a result of
investor panic, the brightest and the most ambitious of the Wall
Street wizards looking for the "next big thing" are creating new,
even more complicated and opaque, financial instruments with
high potential to generate profit - and, accordingly, risk. While it
is important to remedy the obvious wrongs we are now aware of,
an incremental reform through introduction of regulatory regimes
for specific types of financial products will always miss the bigger
picture. A truly effective regulatory reform involves a lot more
than rationalizing the settlement and clearance process for credit
derivatives or mandating additional disclosures by mortgage
brokers. It requires a paradigmatic change in the way we
approach the process of financial innovation and understand,
monitor, and measure the overall dynamics of accumulation and
distribution of risk in the global financial system, taken as a whole.
IV. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE
Changing the regulatory paradigm to accommodate the
lessons of the current global financial crisis is a difficult task that
would take many years of deliberation and debate among
academics, policy-makers and industry experts. While it may be
too early to develop a definitive list of post-crisis policy
prescriptions, now is the critical moment to reconsider some of the
basic assumptions underlying most of the current debate about the
future of financial regulation. The legacy of the current crisis
requires a creative, self-reflective, and open-minded approach to
designing a new regulatory framework for the new century.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the very landscape of the
global financial industry has changed dramatically. Perhaps, the
biggest structural change is the disappearance of Wall Street's
largest independent investment banks, some of which failed
(Lehman Brothers) or were acquired by commercial banking
organizations (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) and some of which
converted into bank holding companies (Goldman Sachs and
Banker, Sept. 24, 2008.
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Morgan Stanley). 13 This multi-faceted process of consolidation and
realignment within the financial sector raises a new set of
regulatory and supervisory challenges. An industry dominated by a
smaller number of much larger global financial conglomerates,
which have broader access to retail deposit-based funding, poses
significantly higher potential systemic risks. This increased level of
system-wide concentration of risk creates a correspondingly
greater need for a stronger, and more effective, regulatory
oversight of the financial sector.
The key dilemma, in this respect, is how to strike a proper
balance between governmental regulation and operation of free
market forces in the financial sector. While this dilemma is by no
means novel or unique to the current situation, the range of
potentially viable solutions may be a lot broader in the post-crisis
era than at any point prior to the crisis.
In this regard, one of the most significant consequences of
the crisis is a greater, and more direct, role of government actors in
the modern financial sector. For example, in an effort to contain
the crisis, the governments in the U.S. and Europe not only
extended sweeping guarantees of financial institutions' obligations
and provided other forms of liquidity support but also injected
large amounts of capital into domestic banks and other financial
institutions and took significant ownership stakes in them. 4 It
remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, the governments
are able, and willing, to retain and use their financial stakes in
financial institutions as policy levers. It is even more difficult to
predict how effective, or socially beneficial, any such efforts would
be in the long run.
What is clear, however, is the need to overcome old
ideologically driven stereotypes and engage in a serious discussion
of all potential avenues for regulatory reform. A transformational
13. See, e.g., Changing Face of Wall Street, Goldman, Morgan become Banks,
BNA Banking Daily at D4 (Sept. 23, 2008); Liz Moyer, Say Goodbye to the
Investment Banks, FORBES.COM, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/
22/goldman-morgan-fed-biz-wall-cxlm_0922bizgoldman.html?partner=whiteglove_
google.
14. For instance, the U.K. government has acquired outright ownership of
Northern Rock, as well as a 58% stake in Royal Bank of Scotland and 43% stake in
the merged HBOS/Lloyds TSB. See John O'Doherty, State to own 43% of merged
Lloyds-HB OS, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009.
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change in the regulation and supervision of the financial sector in
the wake of a global crisis demands a significantly more nuanced
and pragmatic approach than the one premised on simple
juxtapositions of "free market" and "socialist expropriation." The
world of modern finance is complex and sophisticated and requires
an equally complex and sophisticated conceptual framework for
understanding its workings and managing its risks.

